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WHEN IS IT WORTHWHILE TO USE
COURTS TO SEARCH FOR EXCLUSIONARY
CONDUCT?
Frank H. Easterbrook*
I want to talk today about the puzzle of exclusionary
conduct. Aggressive, competitive conduct by any firm, even
one with market power, is beneficial to consumers. Courts
should prize and encourage it. Aggressive, exclusionary
conduct is deleterious to consumers, and courts should
condemn it. The big problem lies in this: competitive and
exclusionary conduct look alike. The dominant firm is an
aggressor and expands its market share at the expense of its
smaller rival. The rival yelps and sues-or complains to the
Antitrust Division and state attorney general and asks them
to sue in its stead.
Can litigation separate exclusion from competition? What
we would have to know is future market structure and
performance. Will aggression today be followed by monopoly
tomorrow (bad) or more aggression tomorrow (good)? Few
litigants or judges are gifted with prevision, and the Federal
Trade Commission recently brought an action against a
group of supposed psychics who widely advertised on late
night TV. If claims of ability to foresee the future are bunk
when made on TV, are they better when made by plaintiffs,
prosecutors, and judges?
Before tackling this question, it is appropriate to step
back and ask what antitrust is for, because the question used
to have an easy answer when Justice Peckham could write so
easily about small dealers and worthy men,1 as if we were
out to protect the welfare of producers. Yet competition is a
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit;
Senior Lecturer, The Law School, The University of Chicago. © 2002 by
Frank H. Easterbrook.
1 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323
(1897).
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gale of creative destruction (this is Joseph Schumpeter's
memorable phrase), and it is through the process of weeding
out the weakest firms that the economy as a whole receives
the greatest boost. Antitrust law and bankruptcy law go
hand in hand.
The goal of antitrust, to be more precise, is preventing the
allocative loss that comes about when firms raise price over
long run marginal cost, and thus deprive consumers of goods
for which they are willing to pay more than the cost of
production.
This implies a program for antitrust: look for situations in
which firms can increase their long run profits by reducing
output.2 Cartels are one and mergers ending in substantial
market shares are another. Vertical restrictions do not fit
this category. For a person who cares about consumers'
welfare, there are only two difficult issues: joint ventures
and exclusion. Joint ventures are hard because they can
simultaneously improve efficiency and facilitate coordination
by rivals. Performing rights societies such as the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") and
research consortia are examples. But my interest today is
exclusion, which comes in two flavors: predatory practices
and raising rivals' costs. The idea of the former is that the
dominant firm drives down price, prevents the rival from
making a profit, and raises price when the rival has been
ejected. The idea of the latter is that price rises immediately
because elasticity of supply has been curtailed. In the short
run predatory prices look like beneficial competition; raising
rivals' costs has a different short run pattern, but it can be
mistaken for any other element of doing business. General
Motors does not sell engines to Ford, and this may raise
2 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981). These days the view that
antitrust law should intervene only to prevent an actual or impending
reduction in output is widely shared. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 927-38 (2003)
(attempting to identify the few, and often subtle, remaining differences
between the Chicago and Harvard approaches to antitrust).
[Vol. 2003
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Ford's costs; but the separation also is essential to rivalry,
and an order compelling GM and Ford to cooperate would be
poison for consumers.
A person concerned about consumers' welfare (a
convenient shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of
monopoly) must be exceedingly suspicious of claims that new
products or low prices injure consumers by excluding rivals.
Lower prices and new products are always good in the short
run; they are what we seek to promote. Claims that the long
run will depart from the short run are easy to make but hard
to prove. As Yogi Berra put it, "It is always hard to make
predictions, especially about the future." Instead of making
predictions that are impossible to test-and will injure
consumers if wrong-wait to see what happens. If
monopolistic prices happen later, prosecute then.
Consider for a moment the claim made by the Antitrust
Division that Microsoft's provision of Internet Explorer at
zero marginal price would drive other browsers out of the
market. Judges cannot talk about pending cases, but this
claim has dropped out of the litigation, so I think that it is
permissible to offer a comment. I was hoping to be able to
talk about the whole case today, but two states have
appealed from the district judge's final decision, and Sun is
prosecuting a separate suit based on Microsoft's antipathy to
Java, so I must settle for a tidbit.
What happens in the browser wars is not interesting
unless accompanied by a claim that after extinguishing its
rivals Microsoft would raise price and decrease output. So
what has happened? Certainly Internet Explorer's market
share went up. Internet Explorer today enjoys the dominant
position that once belonged to Netscape. But did Microsoft
raise price and curtail output? Of this there is no evidence.
Nor could it do so any time soon. There are at least five
other distinctive browsers available-I have Mozilla (which
also serves as the code base of Netscape and Camino), Opera,
iCab, OmniWeb, and Safari installed on my computers. The
last of these was released in January 2003, and development
continues on others. OmniWeb and Safari may be the most
interesting: they run only on Mac OS X, which holds a very
No. 2:345]
HeinOnline  -- 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.  347 2003
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
small share of the operating system market. Yet a chance to
compete for a share of this small segment has been enough to
induce the development and distribution of two new
browsers. This says all we need to know about the claim
that, as soon as one browser gets the lion's share,
competition will cease. In this market output continues to
rise, and price stays low. Claims that prices will rise later
cannot be refuted-the future lies ahead-but why should
the future differ from the past? Anyway, a return very long
delayed can never repay the gains foregone. This is why the
Supreme Court held in Matsushita, the TV case, that a low-
price-now strategy by Japanese producers could not be
condemned as exclusionary.3 From today's perspective the
argument of the 1980s that Japan would use below cost sales
to monopolize consumer electronics seems absurd. Prices of
consumer electronic gizmos remain low and, just as
economists said, any attempt by the Japanese producers to
raise price works to the advantage of makers in Korea and
China."
So predictions about how dominant firms eliminate
competition have not panned out in these markets. To
evaluate whether exclusion may work better elsewhere, one
must formulate and test hypotheses. The Journal of Law &
Economics was created in large measure to test the
predictions that antitrust enforcers and judges made in
major antitrust prosecutions. A cascade of articles showed
that they were unreliable whenever they got away from
simple rules such as "don't form cartels" and "don't merge to
3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
4 Like other supposed "victims" of predatory or exclusionary conduct,
they did not have any trouble raising capital. Money markets are large,
competitive, and liquid; no more is required. No one supposes that capital
markets are "perfect" in the sense that all profitable ventures are funded,
and no others are. Life is full of chances, and errors can be caused by
fraud, costly information, or the stochastic quality of competition. But
these errors are not systematic: it is no more likely that a good project will
fail to find suppliers of capital than that a bad project will do so. (In
competition, if errors were biased, the lenders making such errors would
go out of business).
[Vol. 2003
HeinOnline  -- 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.  348 2003
monopoly"-and there was a high error rate even in the
application of the simple rules. I think it likely that the
future will be like the past: the ability of judges and other
regulators to second-guess markets has not improved.
Economic models may have improved, but it is real world
performance that matters. If "choose better regulators" or
"educate the judges" has not been a successful prescription
for the last 112 years, it will not become a good prescription
tomorrow. This is not a matter of "faith in markets" or some
other quasi-religious creed but of evidence. We want to look
for suits actually filed that nailed bad practices (successes)
or banned good ones (false positives), plus suits not filed
where it turned out that exclusion occurred (false negatives).
Only if the gains from the successful suits exceed the losses
from the false positives can we say that litigation about
exclusionary practices has been a success. And aside from
pointing to the AT&T divestiture in 1982-something that
likely was inevitable because of technological change,
independent of antitrust-few people are able to identify
even one success in this line of work.
In other words, judges and enforcers must be wary of
claims that take the form: "Here is a model in which bad
results can happen; let's use the legal system to find out
whether they happen." That approach assumes away the
costs of false positives. Because these costs are high (that is
what errors over the last century tell us), we should not seek
to test theory in the halls of government, where mistakes
may be inflicted on the populace. Test models the
professional way, by gathering data, running regressions,
and publishing in professional journals. Before predicting
that the future will be unlike the past-that is, before
predicting that judges and juries will acquire a comparative
advantage at identifying practices that are bound to reduce
welfare in the future-one must do empirical testing.
Government fared poorly between 1890 and 1980 even when
the rules were simple. Why should we think that regulators
(including judges) will do well when the rules become
complex, when strategies are designed to conceal relevant
costs, and so on? If the strategies conceal matters from
No. 2:345] EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
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competitors, then they conceal from judges and other
regulators too.
Just as we all insist today on proof that a given practice is
bad for consumers,' so we must insist on proof that a given
legal regimen implied by an economic model does better than
the unregulated market. To point to a competitive failure is
not to show that regulation is better. That is the Nirvana
Fallacy. Government has its own costs and errors, which
may be worse (and harder to correct) than the problems of
markets. Do not invoke a theory of market failure unless
you also have a theory of regulatory failure-and a way to
show that the costs of the former exceed the costs of the
latter.
So where are the tests? Ever since William Baxter
became Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in 1981,
the dominant program of the federal government in the U.S.
has been: challenge cartels and big mergers, but otherwise
let markets alone. Microsoft is one of the rare exceptions.
Every time Baxter or his successors declined to challenge
a practice, this set up a natural experiment. Would strategic
conduct and low prices today lead to higher prices tomorrow?
Consider, for example, the models suggesting that price-
matching programs reduce welfare by excluding rivals. The
idea is that if Southwest Airlines enters the market and
United matches its price, then United gets the business and
Southwest is unable to capitalize on its lower costs; the
implication is that discount carriers will be foiled. A similar
prediction is made for price-matching programs by retailers.
Best Buy may say something like: "If you find a lower price
within 30 days, we'll match it." That reduces rivals'
incentives to lower their prices and makes it especially costly
for Best Buy to reduce its own prices, because it owes an
immediate rebate to old customers. Thus the device could be
used to facilitate or enforce a cartel.
The national antitrust enforcers in the United States
have not filed suit against these price-matching systems, and
private or state litigation against them has been
' See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
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unsuccessful. So have average prices per seat-mile risen?
No, they have not; they have fallen and continue to fall.
Southwest is the fastest growing carrier, while United is
bankrupt. A recent exploration in retailing showed that the
chains offering price-matching guarantees are not the high-
price outlets; they are generally the lowest price outlets in
the market, and markets with more price-matching
guarantees are characterized by lower average prices.6 This
is understandable through the lens of a different model: low-
price outlets need to identify themselves to consumers, and a
price-matching guarantee is a good way to do so. If you offer
(and plan to continue offering) the lowest prices in the
market, then the guarantee is cheaper for you to make than
it is for a rival to make. Your offer is credible and profitable;
consumers act on the information by inferring that you are
the low-price seller. This solves an important problem in the
economics of information at the same time as it drives down
average prices.
Let me give you a few more characteristic examples from
the history of antitrust in order to pose the question whether
fancy-pants theories of exclusionary conduct will lead to a
brighter tomorrow. I invite you to think of bottleneck
monopolies. Today we might be tempted to name a computer
operating system. The old story is one of natural monopoly
in the telephone switch, or of unnatural monopoly via merger
(as when Jay Gould bought the two bridges and the ferry
system in St. Louis and thus acquired a chokehold over train
traffic across the Mississippi River).'
The antitrust response to bottleneck monopolies has been
to create either joint ownership or a must-carry duty (for
example, to "wheel" power or information over copper lines,
6 See Sridhar Moorthy & Ralph A. Winter, Price-Matching Guarantees
(Aug. 2002), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
357600.
7 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383
(1912); but see Curtis M. Grimm, Clifford Winston & Carol A. Evans,
Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of Chicago Leverage Theory, 35
J.L. & ECON. 295 (1992).
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which were called "essential facilities").8 Joint ownership,
the approach taken to the Mississippi River bridges, proved
to be monopoly fortified by law. A duty to wheel leaves the
price term open, so it fails to handle monopoly unless the
court becomes a rate regulator-and few think that the
isolated examples of judicial rate regulation, such as the
blanket license decree for copyrights, 9 have been successful.
The only other apparent judicial solution is dis-
establishment, but that is a loser if the reason for the
bottleneck is either natural monopoly or efficiency, for then
the cost savings are squandered.
If handling claims of bottlenecks is not something that
antitrust has traditionally done well, it has done even worse
when the bottleneck concerns information and developing
technology. Do any of you remember the IBM case that ran
from 1969 to 1982? The Antitrust Division's fundamental
claim was that IBM had become a monopolist in computing
services, and that its platform was a bottleneck to vendors of
complementary products, such as disk drives."0  The
bottleneck was not only IBM's mainframe computers, but also
the devices used to move information in and out of them-
devices (and protocols) called interfaces. A central claim in
both the government's suit and a cloud of private litigation
was that IBM monopolized the market for peripherals, such
as disk drives and printers, by continually changing its
interfaces. Peripherals vendors no sooner figured out how to
connect their disk drives to IBM's mainframes than IBM
changed the interface specification and made the vendors
start all over again. The supposed consequence was that IBM
8 E.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
I refer to the consent decree to which the performing rights societies
are subject. This decree is discussed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
"0 See generally FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND
MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM (1983). Fisher was IBM's
principal economic expert, and the book reflects his perspective, but the
book still has the best story of the case and the industry during the 1960s
and 1970s.
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maintained a huge share of both mainframes and
peripherals. Plaintiffs sought judicial decrees that would
produce stability in the interface, so that third party vendors
could have a level playing field with IBM in selling
peripherals. Suits lasted until it became clear that IBM
mainframes were no longer a large share of any interesting
market; and of course IBM's share was eroded by
technological developments, not legal rules.
But the claim of "interface predation" (today it would be
called "raising rivals' costs") never identified a reduction in
output, and thus it did not identify any allocative loss in the
economy. What the Antitrust Division wanted the court to
enjoin was progress. Newer protocols were faster or had
other benefits. Most of you have observed the process with
your own computers. Ten years ago computers came with
RS-232c serial interfaces, a port that could transfer data at a
blazing 256 kilobits per second. These interfaces were
superseded by several generations of SCSI (small computer
serial interface) ports with increasing speeds. Newer
machines are likely to come with USB-2 (universal serial bus)
and 1394 (FireWire). Both are faster than SCSI; both are
more than a thousand times as fast as the old serial ports
and have other advantages. Improvements to both protocols
are in the works; almost before the installed base of the first
generation of USB was widespread, USB-2 came out, and
FireWire 800 (a third generation of that protocol that is four
times as fast as the original) appeared on some computers in
January 2003. Such restless change is exactly what IBM was
accused of doing. That firms in competitive markets revise
interfaces even faster than the bad old "monopolist" shows
the danger of believing that we can identify exclusionary
practices. IBM's problem may have been that it did not
change fast enough and thus could not keep up with the
competition!
One other story illustrates the ability of antitrust to
identify bottleneck monopolies in information technologies. I
know of only one case in which such a monopoly has finally
EXCLUSIONA RY COND UCTNo. 2:345]
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been identified in litigation."l The offender was an operating
system, which the court concluded was a monopoly. No one
software or hardware manufacturer could compete, the court
held, without access to that operating system, which the
owner therefore had to open to the general use without
regard to its copyrights and contracts. And who is that
vicious monopolist that bestrides the information age? Why,
it is the Data General Corp. ("DG"), and the bottleneck is DG's
RDOS, an operating system for the NOVA chip that DG
included in a line of mini-computers! Yes, you heard me
right. The court of appeals was confident that NOVA chips
were a separate market, that DG was a monopolist, and that
it therefore had to license its operating system for use on
chips made by Fairchild Instruments. I must confess bias
because I was involved in that case as a lawyer, but this
seemed fantastic to me even in 1984, when the decision was
made. If anyone had market power in mini-computers, it
was Digital Equipment Corp. ("DEC"), not DG. But from the
perspective of hindsight, the court's decision seems merely
quaint. DG soon went into bankruptcy; the segment of the
market in which both DG and DEC competed was overtaken
by workstations such as those now made by Sun, if it ever
was a distinct segment. Perhaps the court's decision
contributed to that demise; perhaps the demise was
inevitable. Confident conclusions about who is a monopolist
and what is a bottleneck in operating systems were
converted to a source of humor in a few years. As Santayana
observed, those who fail to learn from the past are
condemned to repeat it. We need to learn from IBM and DG
just how acute the legal system's senses in detecting
technological monopolies are.
The Department of Justice has learned (with the possible
exception of Microsoft), and the Supreme Court has done
nothing in the past decade to give any comfort to
exclusionary-practice claims. In the tobacco predatory
" Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
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pricing case,12 the Court essentially held that no predatory
pricing claim can succeed unless the industry has entered
the recoupment period. That is the best way to separate
wheat from chaff: accept the low prices and wait to see
whether the monopoly ensues.
The Court gave a ray of hope to raising rivals' costs
theories by refusing to toss out the third-party repair suit
against Kodak in the copier market. Some have read
Kodak13 as embracing the search, through litigation, for
raising rivals' costs. I do not think that this is right. A
series of decisions in the courts of appeals 14 has held that
Kodak is about nasty surprises-about a change in policy
that took advantage of customers and rivals' sunk costs-and
does not create any obligation to sell parts to one's rivals."5
It extends no further than an obligation to live by one's
promises. A firm that promises cheap replacement parts
cannot pull the rug out from under those who took
advantage, but a firm that has consistently sold high-price
peanuts at basketball games, or otherwise engaged in price
discrimination, remains on the right side of the law.1" For
reasons I have already covered, a duty to assist rivals has
been a bust in earlier antitrust cases17 and, if adopted, would
do more to dampen than to promote competition.
12 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993).
13 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451
(1992).
14 For one of them from my court, see Digital Equipment Corp. v. Uniq
Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996).
1" One may wonder whether Kodak erred in equating injury with an
antitrust problem; many kinds of loss do not reflect any reduction in
output or the welfare triangle that characterizes antitrust. But this is
unimportant for current purposes.
16 See Elliott v. United Center, 126 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 1997).
17 For two good examples from my court, see Olympia Equipment
Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir.
1986) (the defendant's name alone tells us something about what
technological change does to "monopolists") and MCI Communications v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting a claim that dominant firms must sell their services to rivals).
No. 2:345] EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
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This has not, however, stopped businesses from arguing
that rivals must make their own productive capacity
available. This has been heard most insistently in
telecommunications and was addressed politically through
the 1996 statute whose implementation the Supreme Court
upheld last year.18 Yet a parallel set of arguments, made
under the banner of antitrust, contends that new entrants to
telecommunications need not pay the prices that the FCC has
set, or abide by the restrictions on the services that
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") must make
available, because back in 1890 the Sherman Act required
sharing: it raises rivals' costs for incumbents to insist that
new entrants create for themselves the same kinds of
productive assets that the incumbents already have.
I must take care in talking about these theories, because
at least two cases presenting them are in litigation. 9 But
they have run their course in my circuit and I can tell you
what we said.20 I say "we" institutionally; I was not on the
panel. What my circuit said is that (a) a claim of failure to
implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996 arises under
that Act and is not an antitrust problem; and (b) the
Sherman Act discourages cooperation among rivals and does
not compel it, even if this means that a new entrant must
build a new plant from scratch. The contrary claim is in the
nature of the old bottleneck-monopoly point, but now that we
know telecommunications to be competitive-it is hard to
18 Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
19 See Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272
(11th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc denied (over three dissents), 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26429 (11th Cir. 2002); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. V.
Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 155 L. Ed. 2d
224 (2003). In Trinko the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Antitrust
Division and the FTC, filed a brief urging the Court to grant the petition
and reverse the second circuit. Echoing the Areeda treatise, which
concludes that "the 'essential facility' doctrine is both harmful and
unnecessary and should be abandoned," the Solicitor General contends
that dominant firms must afford access to rivals only if failure to do so
leads to lower output and higher prices (citing PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 771c, at 173 (2d ed. 2002)).
20 Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
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argue natural monopoly when we see rivals building four or
five wireless networks side by side-even what little
intellectual force these old cases had is gone.
My interest, though, is not so much the adequacy of legal
theory21 as it is the strength of prediction. Recall what a
raising-rivals'-costs claim implies: rivals' costs are higher
now; prices are up and quantity down now because elasticity
of supply has been diminished; and if rivals drop out then
prices will rise still further tomorrow. Well, we can test
these predictions.
What do we see in telecommunications? We see
considerable entry, expansion of both infrastructure and
sales; we also see falling prices. There may have been too
much entry-though maybe what dark fiber suggests is just
the inevitable error in predicting future demand. We see
ILECs such as WorldCom in bankruptcy, not sitting pretty
with lower costs than rivals. Quite the contrary, the newer
entrants with more modern equipment seem to have lower
average and marginal costs. This is why the ILECs
challenged the TELRIC pricing method under the 1996 Act,
for TELRIC is based on replacement cost-and replacement
cost is less than the sunk base.
Now maybe my understanding of these markets is bad. I
certainly do not want to prejudge any claim pending in some
other court. But a simple test based on information picked
up from the popular press does not imply that incumbents'
deeds have reduced output or raised prices.
My recommendation is that for the foreseeable future we
leave raising rivals' costs to the academy. Perhaps some day
a template will be generated simple enough for judges to use
in the time they can spare from adjudicating cocaine
conspiracies. But for now the costs of false positives in
dealing with exclusionary-practices claims seem very high-
for a false positive means that we will confuse real
competition with exclusion, and thus harm consumers. False
21 A subject that I have discussed elsewhere, such as in Frank H.
Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 972 (1986).
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negatives take care of themselves as entry occurs. False
positives should be handled by grouping raising rivals' costs
with predation into the set of practices governed by a wait-
and-see attitude. The maxim of antitrust should be: make
war, not love.
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